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Understanding tradition: marital name change in Britain and Norway 
 
Abstract  
Marital surname change is a striking example of the survival of tradition. A practice 
emerging from patriarchal history has become embedded in an age of de-
traditionalisation and women’s emancipation.  Is the tradition of women’s marital 
name change just some sort of inertia or drag, which will slowly disappear as 
modernity progresses, or does this tradition fulfil more contemporary roles? Are 
women and men just dupes to tradition, or alternatively do they use tradition to 
further their aims?  We examine how different approaches - individualisation theory, 
new institutionalism and bricolage - might tackle these questions. This examination 
is set within a comparative analysis of marital surname change in Britain and 
Norway, using small qualitative samples. We find that while individualisation and 
new institutionalism offer partial explanations, bricolage offers a more adaptable 
viewpoint.   
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Introduction 
In 2016, 89% of married women in Britain had abandoned their own surname and 
taken their husband’s, according to a recent national survey1. This is little different 
from the 94% recorded in a 1995 Eurobarometer survey (Valetas 1995). Even for the 
youngest age group in 2016, those respondents aged 18-34, nearly ¾ of married 
women had taken their husband’s name.  So entrenched is this practice that 
women’s name change is generally expected as the normal, and quite unremarkable, 
thing to do.   Transgression, even simple scrutiny, often leads to incomprehension, 
anger and conflict with male partners or relatives (Thwaites 2014). All this is despite 
the fact that, legally, married women - like anyone else in Britain - can use whatever 
name they want.   Most countries in western Europe and North America follow the 
same pattern, although there are some exceptions2.  
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Names are at the heart of our individual identity, and surnames in particular signal 
social, civil and legal status (Pilcher, 2016). So why do nearly all married women in 
Britain choose to change their identity through taking their husband’s surname and, 
what is more, change to a symbolically inferior and subordinate position. For in 
Britain the history of female name change upon marriage is a deeply patriarchal 
history. Under the medieval legal doctrine of coverture a wife, her children, and her 
property, became the husband’s possession. When hereditary surnames emerged, 
married women were left with no surname at all and lost named identity, except 
‘wife of-‘. By the later Middle Ages theological and legal arguments began to see 
marriage as conferring spiritual unity as well as property union.   The married 
woman, in theory, came to share the surname of her husband as a symbol of this 
unity. But in practice, the name change represented the wife’s subordinated identity 
and legal status. Coverture remained embedded in English common law right up to 
the late nineteenth century, when the Married Woman’s Property Acts from 1870 to 
1893 allowed wives control over their own property.  
 
Nonetheless the practice of women’s surname change on marriage remained.  We 
might see this as an example of informal ‘lived law’, not formally legislated but 
socially prescriptive. The state has eased the practice of this lived law however - 
women have a special right, but not a requirement, to change their surname on 
marriage. Legally this change is effected by the marriage itself and the marriage 
certificate is an adequate document for all purposes, including acquiring a new 
passport. (The same rights were extended to same sex civil partners in 2004 and 
same sex married spouses in 2013). All other name changes require a Deed Poll or 
similar administrative measures to legally effect a change, including husbands who 
wish to adopt the wife’s surname, and spouses who opt for a joint name. As Finch 
(2008: 716) puts it, the women’s name change becomes ‘bureaucratic routine’.  
 
This is a striking example of the survival of tradition. How is it that a practice 
emerging from patriarchal history and redolent of women’s subordination to men 
has become so embedded in an age of women’s emancipation and de-
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traditionalisation? We pursue this question through the lens of comparative analysis 
with Norway, which displays an even more spectacular example of the paradoxical 
survival of women’s surname change. For Norway is regularly ranked among the top 
4 countries on various indices of gender equality3, reflecting strong equality norms, 
comprehensive ‘women-friendly’ public policy, and the virtual disappearance of any 
female homemaker role (Kitterød and Rønsen 2013). In addition nearly all couples 
cohabit before marriage, often over the long term and many as parents (Syltevik 
2010). At that stage women partners keep their own surname. Nevertheless most go 
on to marry and then change name. Norway also shows a less patriarchal history of 
married women’s surnames than in Britain. A country of small, independent farmers 
right into the late nineteenth century, hereditary surnames were not used. Last 
names reflected a mixture of patronymic and locational elements, usually the 
father’s first name and a farm name. Perhaps reflecting their key role within this 
peasant economy, married women kept their own names – although these might 
change if they changed farm. Only by the mid 19th century did wives in the urban 
bourgeoisie begin to adopt the supposedly more sophisticated ‘continental’ model 
of taking the husband’s name. This symbol of modernity received state support in 
the Names Act of 1923, through which hereditary surnames became mandatory and, 
as part of this, married women and any children were required to take the husband’s 
surname (NOU 2001). Apparently strictly enforced, the state had created a new, 
more patriarchal, tradition5. The Names Act was revised in women’s favour in 1949 
(they could keep their own name given the husband’s consent) and in 1964 (consent 
was no longer needed, though application would have to be made before the 
wedding). By 1979 the Act was made gender neutral with the presumption that 
spouses would keep their own names.  Finally, in 2003, double-barrelled and other 
joint names became permissible, and the same naming rights were extended to 
cohabiting couples living together for 2 years or having children together. 
 
Despite this relaxation of patriarchal legislation, and despite the ideology and 
practice of gender equality, 80% of Norwegian women marrying between 1980 and 
2003 (the date of the last nationally representative survey) took their husband's 
surname (Wiecek 2003). Conversely, 97% of men kept their name. In fact, controlling 
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for age (as older women are less likely to take their husband’s name, and age at 
marriage has increased) the likelihood of women in Norway taking their husband’s 
name actually increased between 1980 and 2003 (Noack and Wiik 2008). This is all 
the more surprising given that it was only the name changers who had to take 
positive action and inform the state authorities of their naming decision. As in Britain 
keeping your own name on marriage needs no action at all, but this was a minority 
practice for women in both countries. There is, however, one difference from Britain 
which perhaps reflect greater gender equality in Norway. About half of women name 
changers in Norway kept their own name as a middle name – which functions as a 
secondary surname. As we shall see, this is rare in Britain.  There may also have been 
some decline in the proportion of ‘changers’ since 2003, as suggested by qualitative 
evidence (Grønstad 2015) and by more recent register data from Sweden – which 
shares an almost identical legal history for marital naming (Statistika Centralbyrån 
2013)4.   
 
In this article we attempt to understand the role of tradition in relation to women’s 
marital surname change. Is this persistent tradition just some sort of inertia or drag, 
which will slowly disappear as modernity progresses, or does this fulfil more 
contemporary roles? Are women and men just dupes to tradition, or alternatively do 
they use tradition to further their aims?  How do some traditions remain embedded 
in an age of supposed detraditionalisation, where agency is widely assumed to play a 
greater role in allowing more personal choice, and adherence to tradition has 
supposedly atrophied? We have identified three approaches in pursuing these 
questions. First is individualisation theory, a dominant frame of reference in family 
sociology but currently subject to considerable critique. Hence our interest in 
assessing the potential of two more recent applications to family sociology - new 
institutionalism and institutional bricolage (Carter and Duncan 2018). We examine 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of these three perspectives in explaining 
married women’s surname change in Britain and Norway, using small qualitative 
samples.  We turn first to outline these three approaches. 
 
Three approaches to tradition 
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Individualisation 
The focus of individualisation theory rests firmly on detraditionalisation: the 
progressive disappearance of tradition under the conditions of late modernity. 
Consequently structuring social forms like class and family have atrophied.  
Notoriously, in the word of Ulrich Beck, the family became a ‘zombie category’ – still 
existing but without any real life (Beck, 2002, 204). This assumption is buttressed by 
a rather one-sided view of agency as mainly discursive - reflexive, purposeful and 
individual. People, and women especially, are increasingly freed from tradition and 
are both able and compelled to ‘decide for themselves’ how to conduct their 
personal lives in a ‘search for new ways of living’ according to Beck-Gernsheim in her 
book ‘Reinventing the Family’ - indicatively subtitled ‘In search of new lifestyles’ 
(2002: xii). Individual agency triumphs over social structure. There are therefore two 
roles available to marrying women deciding on their future surname (although we 
might ask why they marry in the first place, see Carter and Duncan 2018) – they can 
either be individualisers keeping their own name or laggards stuck in the habitual 
inertia of tradition.  
 
Critiques of individualisation theories are well rehearsed and need not detain us. 
Even by 2012, Dawson (2012) could categorize multifarious critiques as ‘modernist’, 
‘interactionist’, or ‘discourse’. Or put more simply individualisation is nothing new 
and there is as much continuity as change, people cannot exist in isolation but are 
connected and relational, and individualisation just reflects a neo-liberal political 
agenda. Others have pointed to a lack of empirical support for the assertions made 
(Duncan and Smith 2006, Smart 2007), coupled with an overemphasis on the exotic 
and a neglect of the unmarked majority (Brekhus, 1998). Beck-Gernsheim (2002), 
discussing married women’s choice of surname, gives an example. Assuming a priori 
that women increasingly reject taking their husband’s name, she takes this as 
indicating the decline of the ‘standard family’. This claim is based on speculative 
anecdote from ‘London’ and Germany. In fact as we have seen even among the 
youngest age group in Britain 80% of wives had taken their husband’s name by 2016, 
and a mere 2% wanted to keep their own name. In Germany, according to the 1995 
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Eurobarometer, 96 per cent of married women had taken their husband’s name, 
with only 1 per cent thinking it preferable to keep their own name.  
 
For our purposes here it is the strict binary between tradition and modernity that 
provides a major problem.  This prevents analysis of how people actively use 
tradition as part of modernity. Reducing tradition to a relic or a habit from the past 
negates the connection between the present and the ways in which traditions are 
made meaningful not just through their connections with the past but with their 
restatement in the present and signposting to the future.  
 
New Institutionalism 
In an influential paper Cherlin (2004) applied individualisation theory to American 
marriage - spouses pursued their own interests in marriage, rather than acting as a 
couple or following institutional precepts.  Yodanis and Lauer (2014) critique this 
interpretation both theoretically and empirically, taking inspiration from the ‘new 
institutionalism’ of sociological economics (see also Lauer and Yodanis 2010). It is 
institutions that govern behaviours, not the individualised ‘rational economic man’ 
central to traditional economic theory, nor his sociological cousin – the reflexive and 
purposeful individualiser. Institutions are, however, made up of a bundle of self-
reinforcing rules (both formal and informal) and taken-for-granted assumptions. 
Institutional routines and scripts usually lie beyond the conscious scrutiny of 
individuals, so that alternatives are often not considered or even remain 
inconceivable: it is hard to imagine other possible ways of behaving and in any case 
there is usually only a limited number of viable alternatives. Tradition appears as 
natural. Even when people attempt to change institutions or develop alternatives 
they are subject to ‘institutional isomorphism’: external coercive pressures, 
normative pressures, and the tendency to imitate others when faced with 
uncertainty. This is perhaps why fewer women end up keeping their own name than 
would, apparently, prefer to do so. Just 59% of British women would prefer their 
husband’s name, in another 2016 survey6, young as well as old, probably about 20% 
or more lower than what happens in practice.  All this promotes consistency and the 
status quo.  
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This version of new institutionalism emphasises the persistence of tradition through 
institutional stability and resistance to change. This provides a more convincing 
account of why most women who marry in both Britain and Norway change to their 
husband’s name. Nevertheless, this is also a one-sided account, emphasising the 
power of institutional structures and norms. A critical question is now the opposite; 
how is it that some women do not follow these institutional givens and others 
discursively choose them? 
 
These two opposing approaches remind us of the ‘structure – agency problem’ - one-
sided explanations focussing on either the creativity of individual agents or 
alternatively the power of institutional structures (King 2005). Research then lurches 
from one side to the other. Implicitly, the relatively large literature on women’s 
surname change in the USA follows this seesaw pattern (see Noack and Wiik 2008 
for summary). Some studies emphasise the power of given tradition and normative 
cultural expectations (e.g. Twenge 1997). This is perhaps not surprising when, at the 
time, only 2% or so of married women in the USA had kept their own name. But 
other studies focus on the minority of female name ‘keepers’, associated with 
factors like higher education, higher income, professional work, greater age, liberal 
family background, or subscription to gender equality (e.g. Johnson and Scheuble 
1995).  Noack and Wiik (2008) find much the same for Norway. Usually highly 
correlated, implicitly these factors are seen to promote some agency autonomy from 
institutional structure. An overall problem remains however - if some individuals can 
escape institutional structure, why can’t all – or do other people simply choose to 
follow structure? Conversely, if structures are so strong, how can some escape? 
 
Institutional bricolage 
With a focus on how people use culture and tradition, the bricolage approach 
sidesteps this structure-agency problem. People generally possess limited cognitive 
and social energy. When faced with some new situation or problem they tend to 
adapt what they already know, or what is easily available, to arrive at some more or 
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less adequate solution.  New social arrangements are pieced together using diverse 
parts of available existing norms, values and practices. While this adaption is often 
naturalised as tradition, it is not necessarily unthinking or uncritical; some elements 
of tradition might come under discursive scrutiny and may be changed or 
abandoned.  This framework has been used quite widely in some parts of social 
science, in business studies for example. Managers and entrepreneurs rarely act 
through long term, rational planning and resource allocation. Rather they improvise 
plans from what they know at the time, often using well-known ‘rules of thumb’, and 
so create ‘something from nothing’ (Baker and Nelson 2005). 
 
Cleaver (2012) develops this general idea in her theorisation of ‘institutional 
bricolage’ as applied to development planning.  For bricolage is not only a matter of 
individual adaptive behaviour, but also underlies the emergence of new institutions, 
both formal and informal. And, as new institutionalism describes, institutions can ‘do 
the thinking’ on behalf of individuals.  This has several implications. First, Cleaver 
emphasises that new arrangements are most likely to succeed if they are bestowed 
with the legitimacy of ‘tradition’. This is because cooperation and assent from others 
is necessary if the new arrangement is going to work. Moreover, if these 
arrangements are going to have some long-term future, they must become 
normalized to the people who practice them.  People can more easily take part if 
new arrangements are recognisably traditional - for then they will know what to 
expect and have a guide on how they should act. In addition, assent and cooperation 
are most likely if the new arrangements are generally accepted as a ‘right’ and 
‘sensible’ way of doing things, even better if any new adaption appears ‘natural’.  
Further scrutiny becomes unnecessary. This occurs through processes of conferring 
continuity and authority to the new or adapted arrangements.  Artefacts, symbols, 
mechanisms, discourses, and sanctioned power relationships are borrowed from 
other settings and other times. This borrowing also means that meanings may ‘leak’ 
from one time and setting to another. If pre-existing tradition is lacking, it may even 
be invented; indeed it is all the more likely to be invented in times of rapid change 
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when the crumbling of old certainties threatens both legitimacy and ontological 
security (Hobsbawn 1983).    
 
Second, bricolage is a socially unequal process. Whilst everyone is potentially 
capable of being a bricoleur, some are able to command more resources to make 
adaptations work in their favour. These are not only material resources, command 
over things like the means of production, but also authoritative resources: command 
over people, for example in organisations and institutions (Giddens, 1984). 
Authoritative resources include moral world views which are usually strongly 
gendered, raced, and socially stratified ideas about the proper behaviour and the 
rightful place of individuals with different social identities. The more resourced will 
often be more able to adapt or to influence adaptations to work in their favour, and 
to find social assent, while the adaptive ability of others is limited.  At the extreme 
some may have no capacity to develop adaptive arrangements at all.   This implies 
the privileging of pre-existing patterns of authority and advantage. 
 
 Bricolage is deeply social, impregnated with collective moralities, ideas and 
expectations, often hidden and non-reflexive, and usually unequal. Tradition, what 
has gone before, becomes crucial as a resource and legitimating device. The decline 
of pre-existing traditions will stimulate re-traditionalisation and the invention of 
traditions. Rather than the high energy, high stress and high-risk experiments of the 
individualised actor, the social bricoleur seeks the low energy, low stress and safer 
option of adapting ‘tradition’ (see Duncan 2011). The resulting practices are 
therefore neither completely 'modern' nor completely traditional, but are rather a 
dynamic mixture of the two.    
 
We will now go on to explore these three conceptual approaches further in the 
context of marital surname change in Britain and Norway. 
 
Methods 
Our discussion depends on combining three small semi-structured interview samples 
in Britain (2 samples from 2010 and 2014, with a total of 38 respondents) and 
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Norway (2016, 27 respondents). The 2014 British and 2016 Norwegian samples were 
for a joint project on weddings, and were restricted to people who had recently 
married, or were going to do so. The 2010 British sample with 23 respondents 
concerned young women’s ideas about partnering and marriage. In this sample only 
8 were married or planning marriage; indeed 3 were single (the remainder 
cohabiting or living apart together). In all three samples name change was a 
substantive topic but for these latter respondents name change was more 
hypothetical.  Ethical approval was granted by the authors’ employing institutions, 
although no ethical problems presented and respondents were happy to talk about 
their actual, planned or expected weddings. 
 
Respondents were recruited through snowballing in locations in Kent, Hampshire 
and Yorkshire in England, and in two Norwegian cities. Recruitment took different 
routes; in Kent, snowballing was initiated through the manager of a particular 
wedding venue, in Yorkshire and Hampshire personal contacts provided an initial 
starting point, and in Norway recruitment started through Facebook and other social 
media. Snowball sampling can restrict recruitment to those in restricted networks 
who have certain defining characteristics. However, with 4 researchers7 and a 
number of snowballing routes, the samples were reasonably diverse in terms of 
marital history. Nearly all respondents were under 35, although three interviewees 
in the 2014 British sample were in their 50s and marrying for a second time. Partly 
because of the aims of the 2010 British sample, there were more women than men. 
With one exception, all participants were White. While the British sample was 
reasonably diverse in terms of occupation and education, the Norwegian sample was 
biased towards the better educated. See Duncan and Carter 2018 and Ellingsæter 
2018 for details. 
 
We used conversational, semi-structured interviews, with an open initial 
question (‘Tell me about your wedding starting wherever you like’). This gave 
participants the opportunity to identify themes and issues of particular 
relevance to them, and to direct the narrative and frame it in their own terms of 
reference (Mason and Davies, 2011). Interviews were recorded and transcribed, 
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and participant names pseudonymised. The Norwegian sample was transferred to 
NVIVO.  
 
The small sample sizes, and their ad hoc combination, partly reflect financial and 
time constraints. Similarly, we did not have the resources to establish sub-samples 
from minority groups. However, we are not concerned to make descriptive or 
statistical population level correlations or inferences. Rather, we are concerned with 
individual motivations for, and understandings of, surname change on marriage. 
Consequently, we employed an ‘intensive’ research methodology that would better 
capture the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of these processes (Sayer, 1992), as well as providing 
descriptive information. Analysis was grounded on reading each interview transcript, 
identifying respondents’ discursive rationalisations of their ideas and decisions about 
marriage and weddings, including name change (see Carter and Duncan 2016). Using 
this methodology we can make some moderate analytical generalisations (see Payne 
and Williams, 2005) at least for ‘majority’ weddings between heterosexual partners. 
There remains a need for research on particular ‘minority’ ethnic, religious and 
same-sex weddings and also for wider, ‘extensive’ research on overall patterns of 
wedding and marriage behaviour, including name change.  
 
 
Understanding marital name change in Britain and Norway 
There were different levels of scrutiny of marital name change, ranging from the 
uncritical taken-for-granted of tradition to critical rejection. Some participants more 
consciously used tradition for displaying family. We will describe these categories in 
turn. 
 
Taking tradition for granted: habitual agency  
Taking the husband’s name was often just taken for granted by the English 
respondents. ‘Obviously’ as Penny said, she would change her name. When asked to 
explain further, these respondents frequently called upon a language of convention, 
tradition and given social norms:  ‘it’s traditional and conventional’ (Eleanor); name 
change was ‘the right thing to do’ (Lucy). For Jess the meaning of her wedding was 
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‘that I’ll take my partner’s surname. And stand by my vows’. Moreover, name change 
denoted proper family status: ‘it’s just what’s expected as you become a family and 
that family have one name’ (Zoe).  For some participants, taking the husband’s name 
was not only assumed and unquestioned, it was desired and eagerly awaited. As 
Abigail put it, ‘I’m so looking forward to being a wife and having my surname 
changed’. For Adele – who was single- changing her name would not simply be ‘the 
done thing’ but in addition ‘it’s nice to have to be able to say ‘husband’ and take 
someone else’s name and call yourself Mrs’.  
 
In our sample this ‘naturalised’ view of marital surname change was much less 
common in Norway, restricted to two couples who were actively religious and, 
exceptionally, had not cohabited before marriage. Lars considered it “tradition” and 
“normal” that the bride takes her husband's last name: ‘That's how it has been with 
two of my brothers who have married, and in the rest of the family’.  For Lars two 
different surnames would be odd and unnatural, while his name would show family 
unity:  
‘when you marry you become one …and I think it's [name change} also a part 
of establishing a family, that you create your new family’.   
Similarly Kristin -the only woman in the Norway sample taking her husband’s 
surname and completely abolishing her own- felt that husband and wife should have 
the same surname.   Her partner Knut, in a separate interview, said it was more 
‘natural’ for them to have just his and, indeed, their parents had done the same.  
 
Scrutiny of this taken-for-granted tradition was not entirely lacking and some English 
respondents had considered the possibility of a joint   hyphenation of both partners’ 
names. For most of the English sample, however, this was a brief and negative 
scrutiny which served only to confirm traditional name change. As Michelle 
dismissively put it: ‘I think double barrelled names are a bit crap’. A couple of women 
respondents were initially more enthusiastic. But without recourse to alternative 
narratives, negotiation with unenthusiastic male partners was one-sided. Husbands 
could claim the legitimacy of established tradition, while alternatives appeared 
contrived. And what tradition does exist in Britain for ‘double-barrelled’ names is de-
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legitimising, negatively associated with the English upper class. Susan had considered 
a joint hyphenated name but she ‘didn’t like the sound if it either way round’. 
Furthermore: 
[her fiancé] said it meant a lot more to him like me having his surname and as 
I wasn’t particularly bothered either way I thought- nice gesture to take the 
name and kind of do the traditional thing. 
In contrast in Norway the tradition of wives keeping their own names as a subsidiary 
surname is well established.  For example Lars’ partner, Line, wanted to take his 
name. Nevertheless she had kept her surname as middle name, ‘because it's a big 
part of my life and my family’.  
 
Some of the English husbands made it a condition of marriage that their wives took 
their name. Mandy gives a striking example: 
‘I actually didn’t want to change my name but …he said but if that hadn’t 
changed there would have been no point getting married [...] he said the 
wedding would have meant nothing if I hadn’t changed my name’.  
Similarly for Derek, the name change ‘was one of [his] criteria’ for getting married. 
He was glad Alison had become his wife for they were now ‘Mr and Mrs (his 
surname)’ as proudly celebrated on the wedding card. This traditional assumption of 
his partner’s symbolic subordination as wife was, however, given a modern twist: he 
was offering the status of ‘Mrs’.  As he continued: ‘so, you know, I wanted to make 
you feel special, I think, and be a Mrs instead of just being a live-in partner’. At the 
same time this allowed him entry to a particular male status: 
‘And a lot of- all our friends are pretty much couples that have either been 
married for years or they've recently got married and I think… I wanted to be 
part of that club.’ 
As Thwaites (2014) concludes the name change can create a symbolic continuation 
of traditional masculine identity as family head and authoritative presence.   
 
From the lens of individualisation theory, these respondents have not been freed 
from tradition by the conditions of late modernity or, if they have, they have not 
responded for some reason. Women, who supposedly have most to gain from the 
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detraditionalisation of the family, accept and maintain its traditions – at times with 
some enthusiasm.  Men retain patriarchal family power. New institutionalism 
provides a fuller description of this re-traditionalisation process. Given scripts mean 
that alternatives remain unconsidered or discounted while the institutional 
isomorphism of others’ expectations and coercion obstructs departure from the 
norm. The idea of a wife keeping her own name might not only deeply upset some 
family members; others would simply not understand. Some husbands insist on their 
name as surname or, in Norway, the dominant last name.  A bricolage perspective 
would elaborate this explanation by emphasising tradition as a guide to action in 
what is – to these respondents - a new situation. Taking the husband’s name is the 
easiest solution and can make the best claim to trouble free legitimacy. Moreover, 
others – husbands and relatives - have greater authoritative resources in the 
absence of any convincing alternative narrative. Nothing can be worse than a new 
arrangement that appears socially contrived. Far better if something different 
appears familiar, is easily recognised, and appears endowed with self-validating 
truth.  
 
Using tradition: doing and displaying family 
So far we have looked at those respondents who were more passive bearers of 
tradition. But many respondents were more actively involved in choosing their 
name. Rather than accepting tradition they used it – which for most meant taking 
the husband’s name. For, if our names are at the heart of our personal identity, then 
name change can be used as a handy tool for displaying a new family situation. One 
of our English respondents, Ruth, puts this well in reflecting on her imminent 
marriage: 
‘I’ve always imagined I would change my name [...] because it makes you feel 
that you’re one; you’re part of the same thing, you’re the same family and 
that’s - it’s a really symbolic- powerfully symbolic way of saying we’re 
together. 
For people do not only have to work at ‘doing family’ (Morgan 1996) they also have 
to display this work. As Finch (2007: 66) puts it, ‘the meaning of one’s actions has to 
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be conveyed to and understood by relevant others as characteristic of family’.  The 
‘powerfully symbolic’ change of name allows Ruth to help establish family 
connectedness and belonging  (what she feels) and to display this ‘proper’ family to 
others (what this says).  Claire put this even more baldly:  
‘I’d like them to know that we were a family and I think names is quite a good 
way of doing that.’ 
 
Finch sees this display function as particularly important as de-traditionalisation 
proceeds, and families become more diverse and fragmented. People living in new, 
sometimes challenging and often more complicated arrangements, need all the 
more to display that they are ‘proper family’. Alison, an older respondent in the 
English sample, gives a good example. Married early as a pregnant teenager, she 
followed accepted tradition and took her husband’s surname. This unhappy 
‘shotgun’ marriage soon dissolved into estrangement and divorce, but she kept her 
ex-husband’s surname so that she and her children had the same surname. By this 
means she was able to display her own identity as mother, and that the children 
belonged to her. On her re-marriage, and now with independent grown-up children, 
this use of her first husband’s name was not only redundant but an oppressive 
reminder of her first marriage. Her second name change, displaying another identity, 
helped bury this unhappy past. This was no uncritical acceptance of tradition, 
however; she consciously examined the implications of name change ‘for a woman’ 
and had even considered reverting to her long lost maiden name. But as we have 
seen Derek, her new husband, saw Alison taking his name, becoming ‘Mr and Mrs’, 
as one of his criteria for marriage. So using this handy tool can have a flip side, taking 
the husband’s name also ‘leaks’ a powerfully symbolic message about male 
dominance.  
 
None of the men in the Norwegian sample stated directly that their wives’ name 
change was a precondition for marriage.  Indeed the appellations ‘Mrs.’ (Fru) and 
‘Mr. and Mrs’ (Herr og Fru) disappeared decades ago. Nonetheless, most kept their 
own name unchanged and in some cases argued strongly that their names should be 
the dominant last name for both partners. This seemed to depend on prioritising 
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male identity. For Sebastian his ‘considerable pressure’ was justified by patrilineal 
continuity - his surname had been in the family for 100-150 years passed down 
through first sons, so it was important that the name would continue. In 
compensation his wife could have her ‘big wedding‘. Similarly Nicolai had a ‘pretty 
clear idea’ that he would not renounce his name since ‘it's like a bit of tradition 
related to it, and it comes from a small place in western Norway’. His wife, Nina, 
would rather have kept her own name; ‘names are so important for identity, so I did 
not give up my whole name… I think it's bad enough that my name did not come last, 
but I gave in on that’. She had asked herself afterwards ‘why did I not quarrel about 
it’, believing this was because Nicolai ‘was a man’.   Unlike the English respondents, 
however, both Sebastian and Nikolai took their wife’s name as middle name. Guro 
and Gregor were using name change in a similar way – but in the opposite direction. 
Both would take her (Guro’s) name as last name, although keeping Gregor’s as a 
middle name. Their reasoning was twofold - she had a special family name that she 
was eager to keep, while he had an immigrant name that he wanted to lose.    
 
Many respondents cited the perceived necessity of having the same name for all 
family members. This was seen as important because: ‘you feel more part of the 
family unit if you’ve all got the same name’ (Catriona). In both national samples a 
common surname symbolising family as a unit was primarily associated with having 
children, not the couple as such. So, for Jane, the wedding ‘means I get the same 
name as my children’ or as Darren explained, his wedding would mean that ‘Mummy 
can have the same surname. And, it means we can also have another baby 
afterwards’. In Norway Rita and her partner Rune wanted children, so a common 
name would mean ‘we can call us family’. But in contrast to the English respondents 
this common family name would include her existing surname as middle name, 
otherwise she would ‘lose a part of herself’. Eirin had been struggling between the 
‘feminist me’ and her husband who wanted them to have the same name. But this 
was ‘not urgent at least not until you get have children and have to decide their 
names…then it is okay to have the same name’. Brita also had similar problems. She 
would probably change her name if they were to have children, but she was very 
fond of her last name and was afraid of ‘losing a bit of myself’ 
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A family identity is seen as based on a shared name, which shows that the family 
‘belong’ together. But changing name can also be used to reverse this belonging. In 
both countries a few female respondents had changed their name because they 
thought their name was ‘boring’ or, as we have seen for Alison, a way of burying a 
painful past and displaying a new, fresh identity. So for Shirley ‘losing [her surname] 
isn’t a very big deal for me’ because the name belonged to her stepfather with 
whom she was not close.  Similarly Frida had taken her husband’s ‘exclusive’ and 
‘nice’ surname. Nonetheless she kept her ‘common surname’ (as her husband put it) 
as the family middle name as a link to her father and to ‘hold on to what is mine’.   
 
When the family do not have a common name, this supposedly leads to ‘confusing 
the children’ as Michelle claimed. She explained:  
 ‘I know there’s a woman at work that’s got her own surname and then her 
kids have got her husband’s surname and it’s all a bit complicated.’  
Or as Claire put it: ‘the kids won’t know whether they’re coming or going and the 
teachers don’t know [...] I think it’s a bit confusing’. This echoed the responses from 
other English participants, who saw the use of different surnames within a family as 
problematic, confusing and difficult. This view was not echoed, however, by the 
children with different surnames interviewed by Davies (2011); they were rarely 
confused by the situation and were well able to identify family members, 
connections and disconnections. This suggests that this ‘confusion’ is an adult 
concern - rather than ‘confusing the children’, surname non-conformity creates adult 
discomfort because of normative and moral disruption.   
 
Conveying the ‘meaning of one’s actions’ to others, and gaining their understanding 
that these actions mean good family, is not a seamless, uncontested process. In 
particular, new and adapted arrangements must be accepted and validated by 
others. This made adopting the husband’s name all the more likely; creating family 
unity through a joint name, or using the women’s name, was rarely considered in the 
English sample. Indeed, such alternatives may be morally suspect: two participants 
suggested that women who do not adopt their husband’s surnames are actually less 
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committed, or the relationship is seen as temporary. They were not able to 
successfully display proper family, whatever their actual practices. As Hermione 
explained: ‘me Auntie’s married and she’s kept her own name and I can- it doesn’t 
feel as permanent I think’. Zoe, still single, echoed this sentiment:  
‘I think like also if you’ve kept your name it be kind of like saying I’m not 
really that committed to you.’ 
If, for these English participants, taking the husband’s name represents belonging 
and connectedness with family and is a way of doing and displaying family, then 
keeping the women’s name must be the opposite: a rejection of connections, 
commitment and new family identity. This feeling was not directly expressed in the 
Norwegian sample, probably because of the widespread practice of using the wife’s 
surname as a secondary, middle, name. 
 
How does this more active use of marital name change connect with the three 
conceptual approaches outlined earlier? For individualisation theory, these 
respondents might perhaps be the classic reflexive agents creating their own 
biographies – the only trouble is they have chosen tradition, not ‘new ways of living’. 
This approach confuses what people can potentially do with what they actually do. 
The new institutional approach has little to say on this active use of tradition – 
perhaps these respondents show in more detail how institutional isomorphism 
works. But it is the bricolage approach that deals with these cases most convincingly 
in its emphasis on adaption from tradition as a resource in handling new situations, 
and its value in gaining legitimacy. Cognitive and social energy are minimised, 
difficult calculations and negotiations with others about what is proper family are 
avoided.  
 
Prioritising individual identity: rejecting tradition 
Few respondents in Britain rejected conventional name changing practices 
altogether, although more did so in Norway. Among the English respondents 
recently married Josie and Mike both wanted to keep their original surnames. They 
had completely broken with British tradition and created a compound name by deed 
poll. Symbolically, the female surname was placed first. Lauren (a feminist academic) 
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did not anticipate marrying and while she could see the appeal of sharing a family 
name with partner and children this was ‘something I definitely wouldn’t do’. The 
alternative of a double-barrelled name ‘just seems sort of really tacky’. Rebecca was 
more hesitant: 
‘I think I would like to keep me own name … I need to be me and I think like I 
wouldn’t want to lose who I am. It’s took me so long to make myself to like 
who I am… I think I probably would like to keep my own name.’ 
Continuity of identity was the most important consideration for Rebecca, and some 
Norwegian respondents put this more strongly. For Anna ‘my name is to be my 
name, I want to keep it. And be who I am’, Furthermore she would feel 
‘claustrophobic’ if incorporated into her in-laws family's name. Caroline felt the 
same:   
‘I am who I am, so I have no need to change my name.  I have an identity 
feeling to my own name that I want to continue having’ 
Hanna emphasised individual choice, giving primacy to ‘the nicest name’ She went 
on: 
‘it should not be automatic for the woman to take the name of the man, I 
think it's nice that we have come so far that you to a large extent can choose 
the name you wish to choose’ 
Some others in both countries, with what we might call a ‘practical feminism’, kept 
their original name for work or other practical purposes.  
 
Two Norwegian women respondents articulated more explicit feminist objections.  
For Anna name change 
‘says a lot about the patriarchal culture we have had, that it is always women 
who, as a rule take the man's name’ 
Oda held similar views, if expressed more colourfully - conventional practice ‘sucks’. 
She criticised women who changed their names for not thinking about what a name 
means, there was a reason why men do not change, and she criticised men for 
continuing the “weird” practice of imposing their names on other people without 
being willing to change their own.  
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The lack of such an alternative narrative for many other participants allows the 
patriarchal practices of women’s self-negation, and symbolic male dominance, to 
leak from past tradition into contemporary family. Even if alternative notions are 
available, they have to be successfully negotiated. Cathy gave a striking 
demonstration. Taking a feminist viewpoint she refused marriage, instead organising 
an unconventional ‘non-wedding’ to celebrate commitment to her continuing live 
apart partner.  But nonetheless the centrepiece of this event was traditional name 
change legitimated through a narrative of romance: Cathy publicly presented her 
partner with a deed poll whereby she had adopted his name. As she explained: 
‘It’s like a symbolic thing…Internationally recognised. So I wanted to do that 
as a gesture of my love, really, my commitment so I did that as a surprise. I 
mean, he was very, very pleased about that ... I never thought I would ever 
change my name.’ 
 
The three conceptual approaches react in different ways. For individualisation 
theory, at last there are reflexive women discursively breaking free from tradition 
and creating their own biographies. The trouble is, statistically, they are few in 
number. New institutionalism presents a mirror image; these are women who have 
somehow escaped institutional scripts and isomorphism. From a bricolage 
perspective, these respondents are discursively critical of tradition and, with access 
to an alternative narrative, can formulate alternatives. However this examination is 
only likely to be partial. As we saw with Cathy, other elements of tradition will 
remain unexamined and reproduced.  
 
Conclusion 
Nearly all the English women respondents were going to change their name on 
marriage or had already done so. Some welcomed losing their name. Most English 
men simply assumed their wives would take their name and that they would keep 
their own.  In some case marriage was conditional on this change. Only two 
unmarried women intended to keep their own names, while just one couple chose a 
joint, hyphenated name. Not a single English respondent talked about taking the 
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women’s surname as family name. This picture fits in with evidence from the 2016 
national survey discussed above.  
 
Despite a pervasive culture of gender equality, the majority of Norwegian women 
were also going to, or had, taken their husband's surname. However, most kept their 
own name as a secondary, middle, surname so as to preserve their own identity. 
Furthermore, in 7 of the 21 couples women were name 'keepers’, and a few male 
partners placed their own name in the secondary, middle, and position.  There was 
also greater scrutiny in the Norwegian sample, with more expression of ambivalence, 
negotiation and even regret. This suggests some movement from the latest survey 
evidence from 2003 in which female name change was dominant. While most men 
expected to keep their own name, wives are largely left to make their own decision. 
However, we might expect this more democratic and gender equal behaviour in a 
sample of young, mostly well-educated and middle class respondents living in cities, 
as suggested by Noack and Wiik (2008) in their survey analysis. What we can 
conclude however is that an alternative practice to simply changing to the husband’s 
name or keeping their own is available to Norwegian brides – placing their own 
name as a middle, secondary, surname.  
 
 
How successful were the three explanatory approaches in accounting for these 
contrasting mixtures of tradition and new?  With a focus firmly on 
detraditionalisation, individualisation theory can only see those women who simply 
expect to change their surname on marriage – the majority - as laggards, stuck in 
tradition for some reason. It is particularly impotent in explaining why some women 
who change their surname apparently choose to do so.  Those few women who 
reflexively decide to keep their original name fit this model best, although these 
remain a minority in both countries.   New institutionalism is the other side of the 
coin. This approach is more convincing in accounting for the habitual agency of low 
or non-reflexive name changers who just follow tradition, but it is unable to say 
much about how some women escape institutional limits, take alternative courses of 
action, or actively use name change tradition in displaying family. These two 
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approaches remind us of the ‘problem of structure and agency’ in social science 
respectively emphasising either the creative power of agents or the determining 
power of structure.  The bricolage approach was the most adaptable of the three. 
This was particularly suited to explaining why and how people can actively use name 
changing traditions in managing family identity and display. But in addition this 
approach provides explanations of women’s more habitual acceptance of the 
tradition of changing their surname on marriage, as well as why some might keep 
their own name. This relative explanatory success depends on the basic idea that 
people use tradition in differing ways in adapting to some new situation. Tradition 
might provide an easy way forward, but it too needs adapting in the new situation, 
and this leaves space for discursive examination and invention. Similarly institutions 
do not only govern behaviour and impose tradition, but are themselves created in 
tackling change through using or even inventing tradition. Marital surname practices 
in Britain and Norway are neither traditional nor new, but are combinations of the 
two.  
 
Notes 
 1. A weighted online survey about wedding traditions, carried out between 
29.12.2016 and 3. 1. 2017 by Opinium for the London Mint. 927 of the 2003 
respondents were married. The survey is not publicly available, but London Mint 
gave access to the authors.  
 
2. Notably in Spain 77% of married women kept their own name in 1995. In Italy and 
Belgium joint names are most common (see Valetas 2001). In Quebec a 1981 law 
makes it mandatory for married women to retain their own name, as does a 1983 
law in Greece. Both have excited opposition from wives wishing to take their 
husband’s name 
 
3.  See for example the UN Gender Inequality Index and the World Economic Forum 
Global Gender Gap.  
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4.  In Sweden the proportion of brides taking the husband’s name declined from 77% 
in 2003 to 64% in 2013.  Unfortunately, Statistics Norway does not publish aggregate 
data. 
 
5. Although marriage laws were in general more gender equal (Melby et al 2006). 
 
6. A YouGov poll of name preferences, N= 1581 (816 female), weighted, carried out 
in September 2016. The survey has no information on outcomes. www.yougov.co.uk 
 
7. Two of the authors, Emily Garbutt, who helped with the Kent sub-sample and 
Ragnhild Ekelund who undertook the Norway sample.  All interviewee names are 
pseudonyms. Translation from Norwegian by authors.  
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